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I. Introduction
Although the Internet has opened up new opportunities for
both businesses and consumers, it also has made possible a
tremendous expansion in the market for personal information that
many regard as unfortunate and threatening. 2 The computerization
of information has made collecting, storing, processing, and
transmitting information vastly cheaper.3 Since lower prices tend
1 David L. Baumer is an Associate Professor of Law and Technology at the
College of Management, North Carolina State University ("NCSU"). He
received a B.A. in Economics from Ohio University, J.D. from the University of
Miami and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Virginia. Baumer is a
licensed attorney in the State of North Carolina. He is the Director of the
Cyberlaw Initiative at NCSU. Julia Earp is an Assistant Professor at the College
of Management, North Carolina State University. She received her M.S. in
statistics and Ph.D. in information technology from Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. Pamela S. Evers is an Attorney and Assistant
Professor of Business Law, Cameron School of Business, University of North
Carolina at Wilmington. Evers received an MBA, JD, and LLM, respectively,
from Emory University, Southern Methodist University, and Northwestern
School of Law at Lewis & Clark College. The authors wish to thank Blue Cross
Blue Shield of North Carolina for providing a link from their website for the
administration of the survey developed for this article.
2 The degree of concern among consumers about privacy in cyberspace is the
focus of this paper. Protecting privacy in cyberspace is of such concern that
lawmakers have responded by passing a number of laws, see text and notes
infra, aimed at protecting privacy, academics have written extensively about the
topic (a word search of "Internet Privacy" covering the last five years yielded
223 hits using Lexis-Nexis), and a cottage industry of websites has emerged that
is devoted to chronicling battles on the privacy front, see, e.g., the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org.
3 Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy. A New Legal Paradigm?
Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2000); see also
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1198-99 (1998). Kang contrasts the amount of data that is collected from
to provide greater access, it should be no surprise that several
recent polls have confirmed that most people are very concerned
that the Internet has facilitated a significant loss of privacy.
4
Indeed, Internet privacy is a large and burgeoning topic that
continues to change with each technological advance.5
This paper focuses on voluntary transfers of personal
information by consumers to websites and the measures that
websites can take to alleviate consumer concerns about privacy.
Admittedly, voluntary transfers are only part of the larger issue of
Internet privacy, but consumer and website responses to questions
about voluntary transfers reveal a great deal about an uncertain
legal landscape for the protection of privacy.6 The survey
a hypothetical trip to a suburban mall with the amount collected from a visit in
cyberspace to a virtual mall. Kang effectively points out that unless a person
uses a credit card to make a purchase at the local mall, the visit is virtually
anonymous and unrecorded. In contrast, almost everything about browsing
through a cyber-mall can be recorded in minute detail, including websites
visited, numbers of minutes spent at each website, and so on.
4 Part II discusses the literature on major surveys of consumer privacy concerns
on the Internet. According to a recent report of the Federal Trade Commission
to Congress, "Recent survey data demonstrate that 92% of consumers are
concerned (67% are 'very concerned') about the misuse of their personal
information online." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at 2, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2OOOtext.pdf
(May 2000) (citing Alan F. Westin, Personalized Marketing and Privacy on the
Net. What Consumers Want (Nov. 1999)) [hereinafter FTC Report]. See also
IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey, available at http://www-
1.ibm.com/services/files/privacysurvey oct991.pdf (Louis Harris & Associates
Inc., Oct. 1999), at 72 ("72% of Internet users very concerned and 20%
somewhat concerned about threats to personal privacy when using the Internet")
[hereinafter IBMPrivacy Survey]; Forrester Research, Inc., Online Consumers
Fearful of Privacy Violations, available at
http://www.forrester.com/ER/Press/Release/0, 1769,177,FF.html (Oct. 1999)
("two-thirds of American and Canadian online shoppers feel insecure about
exchanging personal information over the Internet."). Numerous other studies
could be cited that reveal significant consumer concerns about privacy online.
' See supra note 2.
6 The paper does not analyze involuntary acquisitions of information such as
those that occur when a website attaches a cookie to a web browser of a web
visitor, even though involuntary acquisitions of information online pose a
tremendous threat to privacy. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1198-99; see also A.
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developed for this article at the website of a healthcare provider
and through a server provided by North Carolina State University
investigated how consumers and websites react when property
rights to online personal information are ambiguous.7 The entire
survey is available in the Appendix.
8
The survey had several objectives. First, it investigated the
willingness of consumers to reveal personal information online to
websites. The survey asked consumers to react to statements that
dealt with various types of information, from demographic to very
personal, such as social security numbers, credit card numbers, and
medical records. 9 Second, survey respondents were asked about
their views of the efficacy of various measures that websites could
take to allay consumer fears of the consequences of violations of
privacy. Consumers were asked, for example, whether they would
be more willing to reveal information to websites that had "opt
out" policies for information collected from consumers and third
party monitors of adherence to their own privacy policies. Third,
respondents were asked about possible adverse consequences due
to misuse of personal information acquired online. Finally, the
survey asked what measures (e.g., game participation, discounts
for online purchases, targeted mailings) websites could take to
persuade consumers to reveal more information.
The survey instrument employed to investigate these issues
was an online survey.' 0 Respondents were asked online what
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1468
(2000) (discussing "privacy-destroying technologies" used in involuntary
information acquisition). Froomkin usefully divides privacy-destroying
technologies between those used to acquire raw data and those used to process
and collate data.
7 Put differently, the survey investigated how people react on the Internet by
questioning them while they were using the Internet, rather than by intercepting
people at a local shopping mall and asking them what information they would
provide to websites.
8 The survey was developed by Julia Brande Earp.
9 The complete list of the categories of information is listed in the Appendix.
10 The URL for one part of the survey was
http://www.theprivacyplace.org/publications.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The website of
Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, http://www.bcbsnc.com
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information about themselves they would reveal in a realistic
setting using actual screen captures, or actual screen displays, from
well-known and less well-known websites. The survey developed
for this article assumed that the use of an online survey with actual
screen captures would be far more accurate than intercepting
shoppers at a shopping mall and asking them to use pencil and
paper to record what they would be willing to reveal to a website."
Part I of this paper discusses the ambiguous legal landscape
that provides context for website acquisition and the use of
personal information supplied by consumers. 12 Drawing on an
economic-analysis-of-law approach (also called the law and
economics approach, or the property rights approach), Part I
discusses the concept of market failures, which have been the
subject of numerous economic journal articles and law reviews.' 3
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology), also administered the survey. At the conclusion of the research,
the survey was removed from these websites.
" Authors of this article have had several previous surveys published in
academic journals. E.g., David L. Baumer and Patricia Marschall, Willful
Breaches of Contract: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 159 (1992) (discussing the results of a survey of over 200
businesspeople). For discussion of other survey results, see David L. Baumer
and Julia Brande Earp, Innovative Web Use to Learn about Consumer Behavior
and Online Privacy, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with authors); David L. Baumer, Julia Brande Earp, and Fay
Cobb Payton, Privacy of Medical Records: IT Implications of HIPPA, 30(4)
COMMUNICATIONS OF ACM - COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 40 (Dec. 2000). It
is submitted that the authors are experienced administrators of survey
instruments on and offline and are aware of the strengths and limitations of
survey research.
12 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1076-80 (2000) (focusing on the uncertain state of the law
of privacy in cyberspace).
13 The Law and Economics school of thought is most closely linked with the
University of Chicago, its economics, law, and business programs. Although
this form of analysis may have begun at the University of Chicago, the influence
is now worldwide. According to one source, "[a]ll of the major U.S. law
schools - Harvard, Yale, Princeton [sic], Chicago, Stanford, and Berkeley
among them - now offer courses in the Economic Analysis of Law and have
professors with Ph.D.s in Economics on faculty." Christopher Bruce, Applying
Economic Analysis to Tort Law, 3 The Expert Witness Newsletter (Economica,
[VOL. 4
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Standard economic analysis reveals some elements of market
failure in the market for personal information. 14 The implications
of the law and economics approach to market failure are used to
predict how consumers likely will react in cyberspace to the
market for the acquisition and use of personal information.
Part II briefly reviews the survey literature about privacy in
cyberspace and shows why the survey used is superior to most
others because respondents were asked to respond in a setting that
is virtually identical to that which they face on the Internet. Also,
Part I develops hypotheses about how respondents will react to the
economic and legal uncertainties surrounding personal information
that is revealed online to websites.
Part III discusses the survey results and interprets them in
light of the discussion of the market for personal information
developed in Part I and the hypotheses developed in Part II. The
Ltd., Calgary, AB, Canada), Summer 1998, at 1, available at
http://www.economica.ca/ew32p2.htm (Summer 1998). One of the early
leading lights in law and economics was Ronald Coase, who was awarded a
Nobel Prize in Economics and founded the very influential Journal of Law and
Economics. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, another important
scholar in law and economics, wrote Economic Analysis of Law, still in
publication. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
Although law and economics is a voluminous subject, its basic contention is that
laws can be understood more easily using the basic principles of economics.
14 A "market failure" is an economic term of art that refers to a class of events
that affects markets and leads to sub-optimal performance. See generally
EDGAR BROWNING AND JACQUELENE BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE
PRICE SYSTEM 21-47 (1979) [hereinafter BROWNING AND BROWNING].
According to Browning and Browning, "[p]ublic goods ... have peculiar
characteristics that make it unlikely that private markets will provide the
efficient quantity. When this happens, market failure is said to occur." Id. at
21. Browning and Browning go on to describe public goods as goods that have
two characteristics: nonrival consumption and nonexclusion. For example,
national defense and flood control are public goods. If population increases, the
costs of these public goods are not increased, and it is impossible to segregate
those who pay from those who do not. For public goods, private markets supply
too little, hence government provision of these goods paid for by taxes. Some
public goods are simply abatement of public bads, often labeled "externalities."
A market failure takes place when third parties are negatively affected by the
production or consumption of a good; air pollution is a negative externality and
a public bad. Abating air pollution is a public good.
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results of the survey developed for this article are sobering for both
owners of websites interested in the economic aspects of the
market for personal information and for policy makers who have a
continuing interest in Internet privacy issues. In brief, the survey's
respondents exhibited a good deal of caution as to the personal
information that they said they would reveal to websites depending
on the potential for abuse of that information to them personally.
There appears to be more willingness to reveal information to well-
known websites than to less well-known websites. In several
categories, women were more reluctant than men to reveal
personal information. Slightly more than half of respondents
indicated that they read and trust websites' privacy policies.
Respondents failed to differentiate between the three most-used,
third-party monitors of website adherence to privacy policies:
CPA WebTrust, BBB Online Privacy, and TRUSTe. 15
Respondents were cognizant of the company brand name of the
website and whether there was an option to opt out of databases.
Most respondents, by a large majority, were aware of the possible
negative consequences of revealing information to websites in
terms of identity theft and exposure of their families to
unscrupulous people. Finally, the typical inducements that
websites offer online visitors to reveal personal information did not
impress the survey's respondents.
15 CPA WebTrust, BBB Online Privacy, and TRUSTe are the three most often
used third party guarantors that websites adhere to their privacy policies. These
websites are available at http://www.cpawebtrust.org ("CPA WebTrust") (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.bbb.org/about/privacy.asp ("BBB Online
Privacy") (last revised June 4, 2001), and http://www.truste.org/ (TRUSTe) (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003). In spite of these guarantors, skepticism about website
adherence to their privacy policies is rampant. For an article about the value of
a guarantee, in which the title indicates the content and editorial angle, see
Carrier McClaren, Privacy for Dummies?: Corporations Hide Behind Fake Net
Privacy Solutions, TRUSTe, at
http://www.ibiblio.org/stayfree/archives/l5/privacy.html (June 8, 1998) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also infra note 46.
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A. The Market for Personal Information and Uncertain
Property Rights
Although there are some exceptions, economists generally
assume that actors (sellers, buyers, and consumers) know what is
best for themselves.1 6 This paper makes the modest assumption
that both online and brick-and-mortar firms who sell products
know that personal information about their customers, and
consumers in general, is valuable. 17 Websites that sell products to
consumers not only acquire information from consumers
themselves, but also frequently purchase consumer data from other
firms that have acquired such data.18 The market for personal
16 The assumption made by economists that people and firms understand what is
in their self-interest dates back at least to 1776, when Adam Smith wrote that
"[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26-27
(Roy Harold Campbell, Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776), available at
http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3 113/smith/wealth/index.html.
17 According to Samuelson, there is at the moment a "lively market" in personal
data, but it is a market in which individuals play at most a very small role.
Many firms collect and process personal data because of its value and because
information technology makes the collection and use of such data so much
easier and cheaper. Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1132.
The 2000 Report to Congress of the Federal Trade Commission states that
"[a]lmost all sites (97% in the Random Sample, and 99% in the Most Popular
Group) collect an e-mail address or some other type of personal identifying
information." FTC Report, supra, note 4.
8 Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1127 ("Consider the incentives of a company that
acquires private information. The company gains the full benefit of using the
information in its own marketing efforts or in the fee it receives when it sells the
information to third parties." (quoting PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN,
NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND
THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)). The Electronic Frontier
Foundation ("EFF") keeps records of cutting-edge privacy actions. According
to EFF, "Right now there is a lack of awareness about how extensively personal
information that has been collected is used on the Net and to whom this
information is shared. Most don't realize the vast information sharing chain that
exists once a company or governmental agency obtains your personal
information." Electronic Frontier Foundation, Marketing & Your Privacy, at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/#intro (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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information has mushroomed because Internet technology has
vastly lowered the costs of acquiring, storing, using, and
transferring personal information about consumers. 1
9
Acquisition of personal information in cyberspace can be
categorized as voluntary and involuntary. As previously stated,
this paper focuses on the voluntary acquisition of information by
websites, which occurs when consumers reveal information about
themselves to websites in connection with the purchase of
products, admission to various cyberclubs, participation in
contests, or through other techniques. Consumer information
acquired in such a manner costs firms virtually nothing after the
appropriate software has been deployed. When consumers and
website visitors click some buttons on their keyboards, consumer
information is collected, stored, and categorized virtually without
any expenditure of labor once the initial software configuration
costs have been incurred. 20 Among the information acquired in
this manner is the consumer's name, which enables marketers to
obtain addresses and phone numbers, thus providing a crossover
point of contact between cyberspace and geography. Virtually all
information acquired online is also linked to consumers' e-mail
'9 Among the authors who analyze the privacy implications of improvements in
information technology and the market for personal information are: Kang,
supra note 3, at 1223-38; Froomkin, supra note 6, 1465-1501; and Samuelson,
supra note 3, at 1132.
20 In a conversation that one of the authors had with an executive at a major
healthcare insurer during the fall of 2000, the executive estimated that her
organization expended $4.00 in costs, most of it labor, when a client called
about a health problem, but the costs of online inquiries were estimated at
$0.15. That magnitude of differential provides a powerful incentive to convert,
whenever possible, to digital and software acquisition of information. See
Medicine Online, at http://www.meds.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) and
Traffic Audit & Bureau Services ("TABS"), at
http://www.tabsinfo.com/news.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) for examples of websites that
advertise savings by responding to patient inquiries online relative to person-to-
person responses.
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addresses and web browsers, and such linkage enables sellers to
have cyber-contact with website visitors.21
Although very much a part of Internet privacy issues,
involuntary acquisitions of information by websites are outside the
scope of this paper.22 Websites attach cookies to web browsers,
and these cookies enable websites to record clickstreams of the
browsers from the time of a consumer's first visit to a website until
the next visit.23 As with voluntary transmissions of personal
21 See The Center for Democracy and Technology, Doubleclick Puts Hold on
Tying Personal Info To Online Habits, at
http://www.cdt.org/action/doubleclick.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see also Press Release,
Doubleclick, Statement from Kevin O'Connor, CEO of Doubleclick, (Mar. 2,
2000), at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/000302doubleclick.shtml (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). According to O'Connor, "[i]t is
clear from these discussions that I made a mistake by planning to merge names
with anonymous user activity across Web sites [sic] in the absence of
government and industry privacy standards." Id. O'Connor did not rule out
merging online and offline data in the future, and other companies may be
tempted to do the same thing. The technology appears to exist to combine on
and offline data.
22 Involuntary acquisition of information takes place when cookies, web bugs
and other creations of software for tracking and reporting back to hosts are
utilized without first asking permission of the operator of the browser. For most
people, whose knowledge of cookies and other tools for surreptitious
information acquisition is limited, information is acquired from them without
their consent or even their knowledge. Froomkin takes readers through a
terrifying journey when he discusses "privacy-destroying" technologies.
Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1468-1501. On the other hand, Froomkin makes the
valid point that if an event takes place in public, then it is not an invasion of
privacy to record the event with a camera. The First Amendment protects such
data collection. An issue arises whether travels in cyberspace should be viewed
as public events. In any event, there is little doubt that our travels in cyberspace
are being recorded, and in virtually all cases, the information is being gathered
without our consent. Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1506.
23 Froomkin uses the term "clicktrail," but the concept is the same, namely that it
allows "savvy Web designers to figure out what other sites their visitors
patronize." Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1486. According to Cookie Central, "[a]
cookie is a text-only string that gets entered into the memory of your browser."
Cookie Central, at http://www.cookiecentral.com/faq/ (last modified June 8,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
According to one source, "[t]o put it more plainly, a cookie is a mechanism that
allows a web site to record your comings and goings, usually without your
SPRING 20031
information from consumers to websites, information acquisition
using cookies takes place automatically once the software is in
place. It is involuntary in the sense that consumers do not manifest
assent to this form of information collection before the information
is collected. Indeed, disabling cookies causes some browsers to be
unwelcome at many websites, thus severely restricting access in
cyberspace. In addition, it is likely that the majority of Internet
users has only a passing knowledge or interest in cookies, web
bugs, spyware, and other surreptitious information gathering
devices used by websites. 24 Fortunately for the privacy interests of
consumers, most involuntary acquisitions of information are tied to
web browsers, rather than to individuals, but that line has also been
crossed by some firms who have been able to link cookie data with
names. 25 It seems likely that connecting online behavior with
knowledge or consent." Electronic Privacy Information Center, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/cookies/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). A "clickstream" is
a record of websites visited and is recorded by a cookie attached to the browser.
24 According to Richard Smith, a leading privacy expert with the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, "[a] Web bug is a graphic on a Web page or in an Email
message that is designed to monitor who is reading the Web page or Email
message." Richard Smith, FAQ: Web Bugs, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/webbug.asp# (last visited Mar. 10,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"Spyware," as defined by a group called "Spychecker," is advertiser-supported
software. The downside, according to Spychecker, is that the software also
installs additional tracking software on your system, which is continuously
calling home, using your Internet connection and reports statistical data to the
"mothership." Spychecker claims that "you have a 'live' server sitting on your
PC that is sending information about you and your surfing habits to a remote
location." Spychecker, What Is Spyware?, at
http://wwv.spychecker.com/spyware.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
25 Judnick v. Doubleclick was scheduled to go to trial in Superior Court in San
Rafael, California, in January of 2002. The plaintiff, on behalf of the General
Public in the State of California, was seeking to enjoin Doubleclick "from
unlawful, misleading, and deceptive business practices on the Internet that
violate the privacy rights of the plaintiff and the General Public." Judnick v.
Doubleclick, No. 000421 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlpriv/doubleclick.pdf. The case has since
been withdrawn after Doubleclick CEO O'Conner agreed to stop the practice of
merging online and offline personally identifying data. Supra note 21.
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names, in addition to browsers, will become more frequent.
Consumers' privacy concerns are likely to increase as information
gathered voluntarily online becomes merged with information
acquired involuntarily from cookies and from other sources, such
as grocery store purchases, credit card purchases, and even public
records.26
1. Consequences of Losing Control of Personal
Information
The technology that made the Internet possible offers a
unique opportunity to investigate how consumers and website
owners react when property rights are ambiguous. Websites
acquire much personal information under circumstances in which
consumers are required to trust that the website to which they
reveal personal information will not take advantage of them by
using the information in ways that are deleterious to their
interests. 27 The adverse consequences of misusing personal
According to EFF, DoubleClick, an online advertising company, places
banner ads and other website advertisements on behalf of its clients. The
dispute concerns DoubleClick's use of cookies and web bugs to track the web
browsing behavior of individuals. Individuals are often unaware these
technologies exist, what they can do to avoid a cookie or a web bug, or how they
can prevent companies like DoubleClick from placing cookies on their computer
hard drives. .. . The lawsuit alleges that by using cookies DoubleClick can store
personally identifying information, resulting in a profile of individuals based on
their surfing history. Online profiling and aggregation of data from different
sources allows others to form opinions, to market items, and to discriminate
based on a profile that may or may not be accurate. Unwanted disclosure of
information may have harmful consequences, ranging from simple
embarrassment to serious problems such as harassment, violence, insurance
cancellation, loss ofjob or home, and relationship issues with family and
friends.
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Judge Rules Alleged DoubleClick Privacy
Violations Sufficient to Go to Trial, EFF Media Release, at
http://www.eff.org/Legal!Cases/DoubleClick cases/20010606 eff doubleclick_
pr.html (June 6, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
26 See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1475.
27 On the Internet, there is an anonymity feature to revealing information that is
not present in transactions with brick-and-mortar companies. Brick-and-mortar
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information by websites include, but are not limited to, nuisance
phone calls from telemarketers, a general feeling of loss of privacy,
identity theft and credit card fraud, embarrassment, and stalking by
undesirables. Given the ease of acquiring and transmitting
information, it is not farfetched to imagine that prospective
employers will someday be able to obtain medical records of
prospective job applicants and even clickstream data.28
Although significant legal uncertainty surrounds the
acquisition, use, and storage of information acquired online, the
Internet should not be confused with a classic Hobbesian jungle
where most activity is directed towards protecting oneself from
predation by others.29 Although the risks of the inappropriate use
of personal information are known to most Internet users, the
transmission of information from consumers to websites takes
place daily in many thousands of routine transactions.3 °
companies can be seen, and these companies generate substantial information
that enables consumers to make rational choices about revealing information to
that vendor.
28 See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1172 ("For my doctor to send information
about my medical condition to an insurance company so that it will cover the
costs of treatment is appropriate, but for the doctor to give the same information
to a prospective employer is inappropriate."). The issue of employers being able
to obtain personal medical information is becoming more and more a concern.
29 "Hobbesian jungle" is a reference to the classic work by Thomas Hobbes,
LEVIATHAN. Life in the Hobbesian jungle, according to Hobbes, is a place
where
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported
by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving,
and removing such things as require much force; no
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no
Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of
man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 62 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston, W.
W. Norton & Comp., Inc. 1997) (1651), available at
http://www.uoregon.edu/-rbear/hobbes/leviathan.html.
30 Apparently, the increasing popularity of the Internet has more than offset
consumer fears as the number of Internet users grew more than tenfold from
1990 to early 2000, when there were over 300 million users. Andrea Goldstein
and David O'Connor, E-Commerce and Development: Prospects and Policy
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
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Apparently, for many consumers, revealing some personal
information to some websites is a risk they are willing to endure:
consumers protect themselves by being discriminating about the
websites to which they reveal personal information.3' It should
also be noted that growth in the online security industry shows no
sign of abating.32
2. Transfers of Personal Information in the
Real World and in Cyberspace
There are many situations in everyday life when
transmissions of personal information take place that have risks of
misuse similar to those that occur in cyberspace. In those
situations, there are expectations that such information will not be
misused. For example, patients and clients regularly reveal
personal information to their physicians and stockbrokers that
could be misused, but there is an expectation that such information
will be used only for specific purposes.33 In most cases,
Issues, OECD Development Center, at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00019000/M00019878.pdf (January 2001).
3 This speculation is consistent with the results of the survey.
32 The Google search engine reveals ninety-seven websites that are equipped to
offer Public Key Infrastructure (encryption) services. There are 471 entries next
to Internet security on the same search engine. [Search date June 2002]. For an
analysis of the interplay between security and the role of access controls, see
Melissa Kern, Note: Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls: An Economic
Analysis of the Anticircumvention Provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 891 (2002).
33 Legal sanctions can be visited upon stockbrokers and doctors who violate a
client's or patient's trust by making unauthorized secondary use of such
information. Note, however, that much information is revealed to doctors and
service providers by patients under circumstances that are less than optimal.
Sometimes the patient does not have adequate time to make an informed
judgment. If the patient or his relatives are at a hospital under emergency
circumstances, they will generally sign most any authorization that is put in
front of them. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos., 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996) (At the
time Ms. Sosa "consented" to arbitrate any claims that she may have against her
physician, Dr. Paulos, it was less than one hour before her surgery, she was
undressed, and she was given three separate agreements to sign. It is probable
that consent to distribute her medical records to secondary sources was buried
within the consent forms).
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professionals such as doctors and lawyers do not violate
informational expectations of patients and clients on a person-to-
person basis. 34 Of course, the legal system has been enlisted to
punish service providers, such as doctors, lawyers, and
stockbrokers, who breach their fiduciary obligations to their clients
35by using personal information for unauthorized purposes.
The fact that medical records are sometimes, and perhaps
increasingly, acquired by those selling pharmaceutical drugs or
other medical products concerns many people.36 Supporters of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of
1996 had twin aims: (1) the portability of health care insurance by
employees when changing jobs; and (2) the protection of the
privacy of medical records.37 By and large, the first aim has been
achieved, but how best to protect the privacy of medical records
has simply not been resolved. Although extensive work and
revisions in the proposed HIPAA regulations regarding the privacy
34 Consumer informational expectations have been dashed enough in the area of
healthcare records that Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPPA") regulations have been promulgated and are scheduled to begin
implementation during the spring of 2003. Note that difficult issues arise in
connection with public health records, medical research, and law enforcement,
which routinely makes unauthorized secondary use of patient medical records.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999))
[hereinafter HIPPA]. Signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996,
HIPAA amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
35 Of course, many professionals are required to be licensed in order to practice,
and if they lose their licenses and continue practicing, they can be fined or
incarcerated.
36 Baumer, Privacy, supra note 11, at 45-46; see also Bartley Barefoot,
Comment, Enacting a Health Information Confidentiality Law: Can Congress
Beat the Deadline?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 283 (1998).
37 According to Conrad F. Meier, HIPAA solved the first problem, lack of
portability of health insurance, by requiring guaranteed issuance of insurance for
workers changing jobs. Conrad F. Meier, How to Implement Kassebaum-
Kennedy--A State Legislators' Guide to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, HEARTLAND POLICY STUDY No. 78, at
http://heartland.org/studies/k-k.htm (Mar. 25, 1997) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). As to the second goal, protection of
the privacy of medical records, see Barefoot, supra note 36.
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of medical records took place during the Clinton Administration,
38implementation has been slow and uncertain. Most patients are
willing to reveal their health records to health care providers for
purposes of medical treatment and payment but would consider it a
violation of privacy and a breach of trust by healthcare providers if
those professionals revealed patients' medical information to third
parties for commercial purposes.39 Indeed, inappropriate use and
abuse of medical records has become an increasingly persistent
problem as those records are computerized.40
In cyberspace, consumers are frequently invited and
requested by websites to reveal personal information. For some e-
commerce transactions, consumers must reveal their name,
address, and credit card number. Many popular websites create all
sorts of reasons why consumers should reveal personal
information, including allowing consumers to participate in games
and interest groups and to qualify for discounts on products sold by
particular websites and other websites (co-branding). Surveys by
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") reveal that information
acquisition takes place at more than 97% of websites.
38 The latest version of HIPAA regulations may be found at the Department of
Health and Human Services website
(http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/privrulepd.pdf); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2002).
39 See Baumer, Earp, and Payton, supra note 11, at 45, which contains a survey
of healthcare workers who had access to medical records as to their views of
invasions of privacy. The practice most disapproved of by healthcare workers
with regard to the privacy of medical records was unauthorized secondary use of
medical records and distribution to commercial third parties for marketing
purposes. On a scale of I to 7, with 7 being "Strongly Disagree," the average
response was 6.36 indicating that virtually all of the healthcare workers in the
sample Disagree or Strongly Disagree with the practice.
40 When medical information was stored as paper records in file cabinets,
pilfering medical records was too risky and time-consuming to justify the effort,
but the same cannot be said of medical records that are stored as computerized
files.
41 See FTC Report, supra note 4.
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3. Measures Frequently Taken by Websites to
Allay Consumer Fears
When consumers interact with websites, they reveal
personal information in an anonymous context, and many
consumers are concerned about what happens to this information.
Websites have responded to consumers' and website visitors'
privacy concerns with Privacy Statements, which are now a staple
of virtually all popular websites, especially those that involve e-
commerce.42 In addition to privacy statements, websites make use
of Terms of Use and Legal Notices links that provide additional
legal boundaries.43
Although website privacy statements and other legal
notices may have been intended to allay consumer uncertainties
about the use of information acquired from consumers, many of
these privacy statements make use of turgid legalese that is
undoubtedly confusing to the average reader.44 In addition to
42 According to the FTC Privacy Report, "[s]ixty-two percent of sites in the
Random Group (compared with 44% in the 1999 GIPPS survey) and 97% of
sites in the Most Popular Group (compared with 81% in the 1999 OPA survey)
post a privacy policy." Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
43 For example, under the Conditions of Use for Amazon.com, the following
sentence appears following Risk of Loss: "All items purchased from
Amazon.com are made pursuant to a shipment contract. This means that the risk
of loss and title for such items pass to you upon our delivery to the carrier."
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-
/508088/qid=1048823097/sr= l-4/104-9329659-5750358 (last visited Mar. 10,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
44 Legalese is very much in evidence in the eleven page Terms of Service at
Yahoo!. Specifically, members of Yahoo! "agree" to indemnify Yahoo! for any
content that is submitted by a member, and Yahoo! can cancel a member's
password "for any reason" and "without limitation." Furthermore, all warranties
are disclaimed and there is a limitation of liability in boldface capital letters.
Finally, members agree that their relationship with Yahoo! is governed by the
laws of the State of California and they are subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the courts located within Santa Clara, California. Yahoo!, Privacy Policy, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited March 10, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The Yahoo! Privacy Policy is a
mere four pages, but Yahoo! reserves the right to change its privacy policy,
which currently prohibits transmission of personal information collected by their
cookies to third parties. Yahoo!, Terms of Service, at
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uncertainty from customers about promises that websites are
making with respect to information acquired from them, there is
widespread skepticism about whether websites keep those
promises.45 Aware that many consumers are skeptical about the
reliability of promises made by websites, many websites make use
of third-party guarantors, such as TRUSTe, BBBOnline, and CPA
WebTrust Seal. These third-party guarantors monitor the
websites' adherence to the promises made in their privacy
statements.46 Websites offer additional control over personal
http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us/ (last updated 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
45 Such skepticism is apparently with good reason because the FTC has
prosecuted several websites for violating promises made in their privacy
statements and other legal notices. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission,
Geocities: Analysis to Aid Public Comment (FTC File No. 982-3015), 63 Fed.
Reg. 44624 (August 20, 1998). Also note the action of the FTC against an
online auction that lied to its customers with respect to its use of information
acquired from these customers. Federal Trade Commission, Online Auction Site
Settles FTC Privacy Charges: Personal Identifying Information Hjacked From
Competitor's Site; Many Consumers Sent Deceptive Spam, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/0l/reverse4.htm (January 6, 2000) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
46 According to TRUSTe, "A cornerstone of the TRUSTe privacy program is our
branded online seal, or 'trustmark.' We award the seal to Web sites that adhere
to established privacy principles and agree to comply with our oversight and
consumer resolution process." TRUSTe, at
http://www.truste.org/about/truste/aboutfaqs.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Similar
comments are made at the BBBOnline website, which, again, provides
assurance that the website will live up to certain standards. BBBOnline, at
http://www.bbbonline.com/about/press/2002/050602.asp (May 1, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
According to Web Trust,
WebTrust helps to make cyberspace a safer place to shop. E-
commerce has been inhibited by concerns over the security
and privacy of credit card and other confidential information
transmitted when purchasing goods and services
electronically, as well as the frequent inability of consumers
and businesses to confirm the legitimacy of companies
offering goods and services over the Web. WebTrust
addresses these concerns while reducing the risk of fraudulent
practices and privacy and security infringements.
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information by providing an "opt out" option, which is a guarantee
by websites that the personal information collected in one
transaction will not be used for other purposes or that it will be
erased following the transaction.47
Despite these and other measures that websites have taken
to allay consumer trepidation about privacy and the misuse of
personal information, consumers remain concerned about revealing
personal information to websites. 48 Consumer fears about
revealing information to websites are justified for a number of
reasons. First, numerous articles have provided anecdotal
information about the negative consequences of revealing personal
information online.49 Second, privacy statements that websites use
to allay consumer fears about the misuse of personal information
are typically loaded with exculpatory language in the forms of
warranty disclaimers, arbitration clauses, choice of forum and law
provisions, and a confusing number of other restrictions and
qualifiers that are written in difficult-to-understand legalese. 50 In
CPA Webtrust, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/webtrust.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
47 Again, opt outs are nothing if they are not enforced. In other words, in most
opt out options, the website claims it erases personal information that it acquires.
Whether in fact the website does erase the information it claims is subject to the
opt out option is anyone's guess.
48 See FTC Report, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org/privnow/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (citing a bushel basket full of anecdotes about breaches of privacy
and the consequences of these breaches). There are several recent articles that
discuss identity theft, which is one of the major negative consequences of
revealing information online. See Miriam Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online
Auction Fraud Should Be Regulated, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 575 (2002); Stephanie
Byers, The Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Stolen, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 141
(2001); Michelle Hall, Internet Privacy or Information Piracy: Spinning Lies on
the World Wide Web, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 609 (2002).
50 Virtually all websites that involve substantial e-commerce will have the
exculpatory terms in their privacy statements and other legal notices or terms of
service. These terms often radically shift legal rights of customers. Examples
are evident by looking at the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service agreements
of Yahoo!. Yahoo!, Privacy Policy, at http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us/
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short, the guarantees provided by websites are likely to be more
apparent than real. Third, when consumers are given a choice
about the use of their personal information by websites, often they
must agree to all of the provisions without negotiation. 51 Finally,
(last updated 2003) (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); Yahoo!, Terms of Service, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In its Terms of Service
agreement, Yahoo! incorporates by reference its Privacy Policy. In both
statements, Yahoo! reserves the right to modify unilaterally. Among other
points of interest in the 11-page Yahoo! Terms of Service agreement are an
agreement by subscribers to indemnify Yahoo! against any actions subscribers
take that may generate liability for Yahoo! (Paragraph 9). Virtually every
conceivable Warranty Disclaimer and Limitation of Liability are made in
Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Yahoo! Terms of Service agreement. By browsing
the Yahoo! website, users agree that they are subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the court within Santa Clara County, California. The Yahoo! website is
typical of prominent commercial websites.
51 Note that there are attempts to allow for more interactivity between websites
and browsers.
The P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences Project)
movement, developed by the World Wide Web Consortium, is
emerging as an industry standard providing a simple,
automated way for users to gain more control over the use of
personal information on Web Sites they visit. At its most
basic level, P3P is a standardized set of multiple-choice
questions, covering all the major aspects of a Web Site's
privacy policies. Taken together, they present a clear snapshot
of how a site handles personal information about its users.
P3P-enabled Web Sites make this information available in a
standard, machine-readable format. P3P enabled browsers can
'read' this snapshot automatically and compare it to the
consumer's own set of privacy preferences. P3P enhances
user control by putting privacy policies where users can find
them, in a form users can understand, and, most importantly,
enables users to act on what they see.
World Wide Web Consortium, Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project,
at http://www.w3.org/P3P/ (last revised Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Getting the world to adopt and use the
P3P will be a major project and success is certainly not assured. Also, there are
critics of P3P who claim that it is nothing but a more efficient procedure for
websites to gather even more information from visitors. See, e.g., Karen Coyle,
P3P: Pretty Poor Privacy? A Social Analysis of the Platform for Privacy
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if a website breaches promises it made not to distribute personal
information to third parties, only those people who have advanced
training in both computer hardware and software minutiae can
detect the breach.52
4. Federal Statutory Protection for Information
Gathered or Used Online
Most websites are not subject to any specific statutory
regulation, unless they target children, for acquiring information or
are storing or transmitting medical information, and then they are
subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which provides some
protection for financial records held by banks.53 Websites that do
not acquire financial or medical information or seek information
Preferences (P3P) (June 1999), at http://www.kcoyle.net/p3p.html (June 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
52 Although most of us are not equipped by training or temperament to
investigate possible surreptitious high-tech means of acquiring information,
Richard Smith is a free-lance privacy expert who has made a number of
important discoveries. Smith, for example, discovered that RealNetworks Inc.
("RNWK") collected computer ID numbers from Web surfers who downloaded
RealNetwork software to hear CDs. Smith also discovered that Microsoft Word
contained an electronic marker that was stamped into every document created
enabling employers to track whistleblowers more easily, before they blow the
whistle. Amy Borrus, The Privacy War of Richard Smith, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00 07/b3668067.htm?scriptFramed (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Someone with Richard
Smith's skills could possibly discover whether a website was not adhering to
promises it made in its privacy policy, but most of the rest of us have to take
websites at their word.
53 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000); see also
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2000). A number of states regulate privacy and transmission of medical
records. The Electronic Privacy Information Center has compiled privacy laws
state by state. The Electric Privacy Information Center, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Federal
regulation of the privacy of medical records ("HIPAA" regulations) has been
proposed but will not be implemented until April 2003. Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2002).
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from children are basically unregulated in information acquisition,
usage, and storage.
There have been websites that have breached promises
made in privacy statements that subjected them to sanctions by the
Federal Trade Commission. 54 The FTC, however, does not have
the resources to monitor millions of websites, nor does it have
jurisdiction to prosecute fraud by websites based outside the U.S.55
In an effort to detect privacy violations and scams, the FTC, along
with other agencies and private groups, devotes entire days to
"surfing the web. ' 56 When the FTC does surf the Internet, it finds
literally hundreds of examples of fraud and dubious promises by
websites.57 There are millions of promises made in cyberspace,
and if the FTC surfing sample is representative, many of those
promises are misleading or unfulfilled.58
In short, legal remedies for the misuse of personal
information by websites are in many cases nonexistent.59 If a
54 Federal Trade Commission, Geocities: Analysis to Aid Public Comment
(FTC File No. 982-3015), 63 Fed. Reg. 44624 (August 20, 1998).
55 For discussion of international law aspects of E-Commerce, see Roger
Reinsch & Amy Hietapelto, E-Commerce and Uncertainty: Managing the New
and Changing Legal Environment, presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Academy of Legal Studies in Management, Albuquerque, NM (August 200 1).
56 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on "Internet Fraud":
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 106th Cong. 4 (April 5,
2001) (statement of Hugh Stevenson, Associate Director of the Division of
Planning and Information in the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, describing surf days), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/intemetfraudstate.htm. The FTC developed the
Consumer Sentinel, which is an online complaint web page. In the year 2000,
Consumer Sentinel received over 100,000 complaints. During surf days, FTC
officials and others literally uncover hundreds of websites making what the FTC
labels "dubious" claims.
57 Id. at4.
58 Id. at 5. The FTC has identified over 6,000 websites making dubious claims,
but in many cases these websites surface and disappear with little or no warning.
59 Julie Cohen makes the point that
[t]he present valuation placed on any given surrender of
personally- identified information is, of course, also a matter
of personal choice. Yet it is difficult to assess the future
significance of a loss of privacy, much less to compare that
future harm with a currently offered benefit .... The
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website violates its privacy statement, it breaches its contracts with
its consumers, but it is unlikely that damages will be sufficient to
justify a suit unless consumers are somehow organized into a class
60
action. Probably, the most potent weapon consumers and those
who look out for their interests have is publicity.
61
The adverse publicity associated with a suit by the FTC or
a state attorney general on behalf of consumers for breach of
promises made in privacy statements could be devastating for a
website's economic viability.62 In addition, there are a number of
valuation problem is compounded by the fact that the trivial
and incremental character of each loss-information about a
grocery purchase here, a magazine subscription there-tends
to minimize its ultimate effect. A comprehensive collection of
data about an individual is vastly more than the sum of its
parts.
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1397-98 (2000) (citing A. Michael Froomkin,
Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash,
and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & Com. 395, 492 (1996)) (stating that as
long as "in each individual transaction the cost of not providing the information
is disproportionate to the loss (which is a function of the cumulation of the
transactions, not any single transaction) a property rights approach appears
unlikely to have much real influence on database creation").
60 According to Eugene Volokh,
Thus, I certainly do not claim that a contractual approach to
information privacy, even with a large dollop of implied
contract, is a panacea for information privacy advocates. As
Paul Schwartz and others have pointed out, there is much that
information privacy advocates may want but that contract will
not provide.
Volokh, supra note 12, at 1062 (citing Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and the Public Sector Regulation in the
United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553 (1995)).
61 Adverse publicity generated by the discoveries of Richard Smith and other
privacy sleuths caused (1) RealNetworks to change its software so that the
musical preferences of users were no longer reported back to RealNetworks; (2)
Intel to change its chips so that users of Microsoft Word could not be traced; and
(3) DoubleClick to back off on merging online and offline data. See
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, supra note 52 and accompanying text.
62 The importance of website avoidance of negative publicity is discussed by
MCA Public Relations, an online public relations firm. MCA Public Relations,
at http://www.mcapublicrelations.com/newsletters/march.html (Mar. 2000) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). A positive feature
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private watchdog groups that are active in investigating and
publicizing breaches of promises made by websites in privacy
statements. 63 Still, to the average consumer, legal remedies are
inadequate, and because they are inadequate, polls reveal that most
consumers feel powerless to control what happens to personal
information revealed to websites. 64 For most consumers, their only
power is the power to withhold information about themselves from
websites, websites that need such information for their economic
viability.
5. Markets and Market Failures
For most tangible goods, property rights are generally well-
defined, in the sense that the legal ownership of such goods is not
subject to competing claims.65 Purchasers reward those who
acquire or produce goods efficiently to the extent that the
producers' costs of production plus transfer costs are less than
what transferees are willing to pay for the goods. 66 Markets evolve
to facilitate the appropriation of the value of goods by rewarding
those who specialize in the acquisitionproduction, and sale of
goods with minimum transaction costs.
of the World Wide Web is the plethora of alternatives. If you are not convinced
about the integrity of a website, there are seemingly many substitutes just a few
clicks away.
63 The Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Resources, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/privacy_resources_faq.html (last updated May 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (listing 17
separate privacy watchdog groups, among which are its own operations, Electric
Frontier Foundation, the ACLU, and many others).
64 See Samuelson, supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Kang, supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
65 The seminal article in the law and economics literature that deals with the
importance of property rights was written by Nobel Prize winner, Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
66 A basic proposition of economics is that trade takes place when the value of
the thing being traded is worth less to the seller than it is to the buyer. See, e.g.,
JACK HIRSHLEIFER AND DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
193-216 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter HIRSHLEIFER AND HIRSHLEIFER].
67 Transaction costs are the costs above those associated with producing and
transporting goods, such as the opportunity cost of time spent negotiating as to
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It is apparent, of course, that not every market operates
flawlessly. Market failures, often prompting governmental
intervention, occur when property rights are not well-defined,
transaction costs are high, and there are external costs borne by
third parties associated with the production or consumption of
goods, for which legal status is unclear.68 For example, clean air is
a good for which property rights are not easily defined. If factories
and car owners pollute air without incurring the costs of polluted
air borne by society, there will be too much pollution and too little
incentive among polluters, both producers and consumers, to take
69
anti-pollution measures. In addition, as with many market
failures, there is the free-rider problem. y As a result, without
price. Id. at 410-19. Clarkson and Miller write that, "Exchange between two
parties has its costs of offers, negotiations, acceptance, delivery, inspections,
warranty, and other activities associated with the exchange of goods and
services, generally called transactions costs." KENNETH CLARKSON AND ROGER
MILLER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
20 (1982).
68 "Market failure" has been explained in numerous articles by economists, and
it is standard fare in most economics textbooks. See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER &
HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 66, at 484. Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the
Seventh Circuit, states,
Monopoly, pollution, fraud, mistake, mismanagement and
other unhappy by-products of the markets are conventionally
viewed as failures of the market's self-regulatory mechanisms
and therefore as appropriate occasions for public regulation.
But this way of looking at the matter is misleading. The
failure is ordinarily a failure of the market and of the rules of
the market prescribed by the common law.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 343 (3d ed. 1986).
69 See HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 66, at 485.
70 Readers of this journal undoubtedly are familiar with the concept of"free
riders." Efforts to clean up the environment on a voluntary basis are plagued by
the free rider problem because the activities of a single individual will not make
the environment significantly cleaner or dirtier. Therefore, each individual has
an incentive to "free ride" on others who bear the costs of a cleanup. A similar
situation occurs in cyberspace. All websites would benefit if consumers were
more forthcoming with information, but that is not going to occur as long as the
legal environment for information acquisition and use is so nebulous. If a single
website adheres to fair information principles, and most do not, the website is
harmed because its customers are still reluctant to reveal information to that
website. On the other hand, if nearly all websites adhere to fair information
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government regulation, there is little incentive on the part of
polluters not to pollute or to invest in pollution abatement
technology.71 If a firm chooses not to pollute, it will not
appreciably affect the environment, and the firm's profits will be
lowered by the amount of extra costs incurred in polluting less.
6. Markets and Market Failure in Cyberspace
There have been many authors who have commented upon
what they regard as the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the market
for personal information acquired online by websites. 2 In fact, the
legal literature on Internet privacy is enormous, but the law is just
one of several disciplines contributing to discussions of online
privacy.73 The focus of this paper is not to provide a summary of
the Internet privacy literature. Instead, the perspective employed
in this paper is that the online acquisition of personally identifiable
information should be viewed as a market because markets and
market failures yield useful predictions that can be tested. In
particular, this paper develops the notion that because property
rights to personal information are not well-defined, a market
policies, dishonest websites that do not adhere to the promises made in Privacy
Policies can free ride on the reputational honesty created by honest websites.
BROWNING AND BROWNING, supra note 14, at 24-27 (discussing free riders in
some detail).
71 "As the group size increases, it is more likely that everyone will behave as a
free rider, and the public good will not be provided." Id., at 25. Needless to say,
the size of groups on the Internet, both websites and browsers, is well beyond
the level in which negotiations among and between groups is feasible.
72 Using the Lexis-Nexis Legal Research search engine and the key terms,
"Internet Privacy" generated 267 "hits" among law reviews. (June 2002).
73 The issue of privacy in cyberspace has attracted the attention of IT
(information technology) academics and professionals, who often publish in
various branches of the Association of Computing Machinery journal. See
Association of Computing Machinery, at http://www.acm.org/ (last visited Mar.
11, 2003). Other IT journals have tackled the issue of privacy in cyberspace, as
well. See Management Information Systems Quarterly, at http://www.misq.org/
(last updated Dec. 12, 2002); Journal of Management Information System, at
http://jmis.bentley.edu (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
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failure takes place similar to that which took place in the market
for clean air before the Clean Air Act was enacted in 197 1.74
Some have tried to make the best of a bad situation by
viewing the very concept of Internet privacy as an oxymoron. This
view was perhaps best articulated by the much-cited statement of
Sun Microsystems, Inc. CEO Scott McNealy, who was quoted as
saying, "You have zero privacy. Get over it."75 Other analysts,
however, are not quite as pessimistic. 76 It is one thing to recognize
that the current situation is lamentable because privacy
expectations are often defeated, but it is quite another thing to
throw up one's hands and declare the situation unsolvable.
One way of articulating what is wrong with the online
market for personal information is to analyze it as a market
failure. 77 Personal information, obtainable in cyberspace, can be
viewed in much the same light as many of the goods that have
been subject to market failures in traditional markets. The failure
of the market for personal information, according to Professor
Samuelson, takes place because a company that acquires private
information through a website derives the full benefit of "using the
information in its own marketing efforts or in the fee it receives
when it sells the information to third parties" without suffering the
losses from disclosure of private information.7 8 Applying basic
74 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671c (1999).
75 James Freeman, You Have Zero Privacy... Get Over It, USA TODAY
(September 8, 1999) (quoting McNealy), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/comment/columnists/freeman/ncj f30.htm.
McNealy's comment was in response to a question about online privacy at a
product launch. See also Edward C. Baig, Marcia Stepanek & Neil Gross,
Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info, What's In It For You?, Bus.
WK. 84 (Apr. 5, 1999) (quoting McNealy).
76 Many of the authors of the law reviews cited in this article are cognizant of
the magnitude of the threats high-tech innovation has posed to personal privacy,
but have not raised a white flag and given up. See e.g., Samuelson, supra note
3.
77 It is contended that the laws of economics operate in cyberspace. A market
failure in cyberspace has the same characteristics as those that occur in the
"real" world.
78 Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1127 (quoting PETER P. SWIRE AND ROBERT E.
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)).
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principles of economic analysis of property rights that have been
applied to numerous other market failures, Samuelson concludes
that "[i]n economic terms, the company internalizes the gains from
using the information but can externalize some of the losses and
has a systematic incentive to overuse it."
79
The market for personal information in cyberspace is
similar to the unregulated market for clean air: the polluter
internalizes clean air and uses it for gain but largely externalizes
the costs of polluted air.8 ° When websites acquire personal
information, they normally do not pay consumers for the
information, and consumers are not really sure of the uses made of
that information. 8 1 If personal information is abused, consumers
suffer loss of utility in the same way they suffer loss when a
factory dirties the air and consumers have to breathe the results. It
could be argued that websites obtaining personal information from
consumers are unjustly enriching themselves at the expense of
consumers in the same way that factories are not paying the full
costs of production when they pollute the air without paying for
the social costs of air pollution.
82
79 Samuelson notes that
This market failure is made worse by the costs of bargaining
for the desired level of privacy. It can be daunting for an
individual consumer to bargain with a distant Internet
merchant.., about the desired level of privacy. To be
successful, bargaining might take time, effort, and
considerable expertise in privacy issues.
Id. On the issue of overuse or excessive quantities being produced when the
market produces negative, external effects, see BROWNING AND BROWNING,
supra note 14, at 35-38.
80 On the economics of air pollution, see WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 14-16 (2d ed. 1988).
81 According to the Federal Trade Commission, "The level of consumer unease
is reflected in the results of a recent study in which 92% of respondents from
online households stated that they do not trust online companies to keep their
personal information confidential, and 82% agreed that government should
regulate how online companies use personal information." FTC Report, supra
note 4, at 2 (footnote omitted).82 See BROWNING AND BROWNING, supra note 14, at 24-35. When a negative
externality occurs, third parties are harmed and essentially pay the consequences
of the harm, costs that the producers of the harm avoid. In comparison, when
information obtained from consumers is used in ways that the consumers do not
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7. Self-Regulation and Free Riders
In an unregulated environment, a firm that installs air-
pollution abatement equipment does not have a way of charging its
customers extra for being a good corporate citizen, particularly if
the goods sold are undifferentiated commodities. Steel, for
example, produced in a less-polluting manner would not be
differentiable from steel produced in the customary manner, as all
would sell for the same price.83 Unless the government sets
pollution standards, there will be a race to the bottom among
polluters because the actions of any one polluter, producer, or
consumer will have no perceptible impact on the atmosphere.
As with air pollution, the free-rider problem exists in
cyberspace and effectively blunts efforts of responsible websites.
84
Ethical website behavior is defined as that which corresponds to
the five Fair Information Practices propounded by the FTC.
85
Ethical behavior by individual websites will have no impact on the
overall legal environment in cyberspace unless consumers can
anticipate or authorize, they suffer the externalized costs of privacy invasion,
while websites are able to capitalize monetarily from the sale or use of that
information.
83 Certainly, upscale grocery stores carry premium (organic) food products that
frequently advertise the lack of fertilizers or pesticides used in growing such
foods, and such food products often carry premium prices. These food products
are differentiated in a way that allows those who subscribe to these values to
reward these producers.
84 If one website adheres to ethical standards, such as those proposed by the
FTC, such actions will have no discernible impact on the overall public
perception of the integrity of the cyberspace market environment. See FTC
Report, supra note 4, at iii.
85 The FTC Fair Information Practices ("FIPs") are: Notice-people are entitled
to be notified if an information file is being kept on them; Choice-people
should be entitled to have a say in how personally identifying information is
used; Access-websites should offer access so that errors can be corrected;
Security--websites should be required to use commercially reasonable means to
protect personal data from outside interception; and Enforcement-there should
be a way for those harmed by collection of information about them to pursue
legal remedies. Id.
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recognize it.86 Since it can be presumed that no website advertises
that it does not adhere to its own stated privacy policy, the
important question is how websites can credibly signal to
consumers that they are trustworthy and that personally identifying
information can be safely disclosed to them.
A number of solutions come to mind. Websites could, in
effect, tell consumers, "You don't need to trust us, because we
have a third party monitoring our adherence to the promises made
in our privacy statement. We are entitled to display the TRUSTe
certification on our website. We can be trusted!" Not quite,
according to Michael Froomkin and others who have studied the
issue.87 As of March 2002, a TRUSTe "white paper" claims to
have over 1,500 online merchants who pay up to $9,000 for the
right to license and display the TRUSTe logo on their website.
88
TRUSTe does not really monitor whether a website adheres to its
privacy policy, but rather, it verifies that the website does indeed
have a privacy policy.89 In addition, TRUSTe investigates
complaints by consumers that a website is not adhering to its
privacy policy, but according to Froomkin, the "meaningfulness of
86 The fact that a website claims to respect personal data does not distinguish the
website. Virtually, all websites claim to respect personal data.
87 According to Froomkin,
The meaningfulness of the 'trustmark' recently was called into
question by the actions of a trustmark holder. TRUSTe
confirmed that thirteen million copies of trustmark holder
RealNetworks' RealJukebox Software had created 'globally
unique identifiers' ('GUIDs') and transmitted them to
RealNetworks via the Internet every time the software was in
use. The GUID could be associated with the user's
registration information to create a profile of their listening
habits. RealNetworks' privacy policy disclosed none of these
facts.
Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1525. It should be noted that RealNetworks.com no
longer displays the TRUSTe logo. The reason for this change is unknown to the
authors.
88 See TRUSTe, at http://www.truste.org/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). For multiple corporate
brands, TRUSTe charges as much as $25,000 for the right to display its
trustmark.
89 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1525.
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the 'trustmark' has been called into question." 90 Froomkin and
others question the integrity of the guarantees of TRUSTe and
other third party monitors of websites that license the logo because
there have been a number of well-publicized breaches of promises
made by websites, and yet, these websites have retained their
trustmark. In sum, third-party monitors, such as TRUSTe, face an
inherent conflict of interest: every time they declare a website
unworthy of licensing its logo, they reduce their licensing revenues
by the amount received from that website. Not surprisingly, there
have been few examples of websites that have been condemned by
TRUSTe and other third party guarantors.
91
It is possible that the market will cure itself. The
meaningfulness of the promises made by TRUSTe and other third
party monitors could improve until the problem of lack of trust
among consumers of website promises is significantly reduced.
92
Self-regulation as an antidote to fraud has worked reasonably well
in some markets, though often with governmental sanctions
available to augment private actions. 93 Satisfactory solutions to the
90 Id.
9' Froomkin states,
Critics suggest that TRUSTe's unwillingness to remove or
suspend a trustmark results from its funding structure. . . If
TRUSTe were to start suspending trustmarks, it would lose
revenue; if it were to get a reputation for being too aggressive
toward clients, they might decide they are better off without a
trustmark and the attendant hassle.
Id. at 1526-27 (referencing website listing TRUSTe's corporate sponsors).
92 Note that TRUSTe is currently doing more than just monitoring whether a
website has a privacy policy. One TRUSTe web page describes their "seeding"
program that monitors whether websites are actually adhering to the claims
made in their privacy statements. According to the company, "TRUSTe
regularly 'seeds' Websites, which is the process of tracking unique identifiers in
the site's database. We submit unique user information ourselves and monitor
results to ensure that your site is practicing information collection and use
practices that are consistent with its stated policies." TRUSTe, at
http://www.truste.com/programs/puboversight.html (last visited Mar. 1 1, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
93 Froomkin opines that, "[w]ithout some sort of government intervention to
encourage self-regulation, 'wolves self-regulate for the good of themselves and
the pack, not the deer."' Froomkin, supra note 6, at 1524 (quoting Roger
Clarke, The Legal Context of Privacy-Enhancing and Privacy Sympathetic
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misuse of information conveyed to websites could occur in the
absence of explicit governmental regulations. Many pessimists,
however, argue that the gains from cheating, in the form of
unauthorized secondary uses of personal information, appear great
relative to the costs, especially in light of the apparently small
probability of detection.94 For most people, the value of defeated
expectations of privacy is likely to be modest and not likely to
justify filing a lawsuit. Given the difficulty of valuing losses of
privacy and the rather modest damage figures due to breaches of
promises made by websites in their privacy statements, the only
real legal alternative may be class action suits or suits on behalf of
citizens by states' attorneys general. Such litigation is likely to be
long and unlikely to assuage consumer concerns that there are few
effective remedies if websites do not adhere to their privacy
policies.
8. The Current State of Affairs
Both commentators and polls of the general public agree
that the acquisition of personal information online is potentially
threatening. The results of the survey developed for this article
confirm that most consumers are unaware that there are
consequences associated with the misuse of personal information
acquired online; such consequences can range from inconvenience
and calls by telemarketers to more serious events, such as identity
theft and credit card fraud.95 Most consumers are very concerned
Technologies (Apr. 12, 1999), at
http://www.anv.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Florham/html).
94 Froomkin, supra note 6, is one author pessimistic about the efficacy of self-
regulation curing privacy problems in cyberspace. The fact that so many
lawmakers, academics, and privacy-related websites have examined this topic is
a further indication that lack of privacy in cyberspace is a market failure. See
e.g., the Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 2.
95 The survey results, discussed infra pp. 260-69, show that a large majority of
the respondents were very aware of the downside risks of misuse of personal
information gathered online.
SPRING 20031
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
about cyberstalking and contact from unscrupulous individuals as a
result of information distributed online.
96
Despite these concerns, millions of consumers disclose
crucial information voluntarily every day to websites that appear
reliable. Consumers routinely reveal credit card numbers to order
merchandise online. They reveal their home addresses, business
and home telephone numbers, and other personally identifying
information in connection with business-to-consumer ("B2C") e-
tailing. In addition, consumers reveal much information to
websites in connection with various games and contests. There is
no way of knowing at this point how much larger e-commerce
would be if the legal environment for personal information in
cyberspace were more stable and defined.97 Respondents'
concerns, however, suggest that reducing legal uncertainty could
significantly increase the size of the market.
96 The survey results reinforcing this contention are shown infra pp. 51-52. The
U.S. Department of Justice has an excellent article about cyberstalking entitled
1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (August 1999), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The article discusses statistics
and provides anecdotes that illustrate the cyberstalking problem.
97 More privacy protection is not a free good. Robert W. Hahn, Director of AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, estimates that website
compliance costs of implementing proposed online legislation are between $9
and $36 billion. Robert W. Hahn, An Assessment of The Costs Of Proposed
Online Privacy Legislation, at 23, unpublished manuscript (May 7, 2000) (on
file with author). Proposed legislation analyzed in Hahn's study includes:
Consumer Privacy Protection Act (S. 2602), Consumer Internet Privacy
Enhancement Act (H.R. 237 & S. 2928), Consumer Online Privacy and
Disclosure Act (H.R. 347), and Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act (S.
197 & H.R. 112).
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II. Literature Review of Online Surveys, Survey Design, and
Hypotheses Generated
A. Recent Research Dealing with Online Privacy
Numerous major studies of Internet privacy have made use
of surveys. 98 In 1997, a survey by Westin of American computer
users over the age of eighteen explored user concerns about issues
ranging from communication by e-mail, fax, and telephone to
marketing to computer users while online and offline. 99 It also
explored group differences between heavy and light Internet users,
as well as the differences between male and female computer use.
The general finding was that computer users tend to have fears
about online privacy invasions that greatly exceed the actual
occurrences of those invasions. 100 The Westin survey also
revealed that 58% of respondents indicated that information was
requested from them while merely visiting websites.' 0l Although
79% of respondents refused at some point to provide some
information requested by websites, 61% admitted that they
provided some of the information requested."' 71% of
respondents who declined to reveal information to websites, or
revealed false information to websites, also indicated that they
would have revealed accurate information if they had had an on-
98 See FTC Report, supra note 4; Alan F. Westin and Opinion Research
Corporation, Personalized Marketing and Privacy on the Net: What Consumers
Want (November 1999), available at http://www.pandab.org (last visited June
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); IBM
Privacy Survey, supra note 4; D.R. Home and D.A. Home, Privacy: A
Paranoid's View, 24 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 351 (1997); Baumer,
Earp, and Payton, supra note 11; Julia B. Earp and Fay Cobb Payton, Dirty
Laundry: Privacy Issues for IT Professionals, 2 IEEE IT PROFESSIONAL
51(2000).
99 Louis Harris & Associates and Dr. Alan F. Westin, April 1997: Commerce,
Communication, and Privacy Online (April 1997), at
http://www.pandab.org/compsurv.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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going business relationship with the website owner. 103 In the same
survey, 63% said that they would have supplied the information
the website requested had the website clearly informed them how
the information would be used before requesting the
information.' 
04
In a follow-up telephone survey the next year, Westin
addressed the privacy concerns of Internet users, specifically, their
experiences, concerns, and policy preferences. 0 5 It established the
concrete steps Internet users want business websites to take to
strengthen Internet users' confidence that the personal information
users provide to websites will be properly managed. A striking
result of the survey was that 96% of those who made purchases
online said that it was important for websites to post privacy
notices, and 72% of respondents indicated that posting privacy
notices was "very important." 0 6 It is important to note, however,
that the survey was conducted in 1998. By the year 2003, privacy
notices are clearly the industry norm for websites.
In a 1999 follow-up survey, Westin found that 12% of
respondents felt that revealing their personal information for
benefits, even if informed how the information would be used,
would violate their individual privacy boundaries.' 07 On the other
end of the scale, 13% of respondents agreed that if the website
"informs me what will be done with my information, and I like the
benefit and [will] not be offended by the use, I would be willing to
trade my privacy for membership in the website sponsored
103 Id.
104 id.
105 Louis Harris & Associates, Inc. and Dr. Alan F. Westin, E-Connerce and
Privacy: What Net Users Want, available at
http://www.pandab.org/ecommercesurvey.html (June 1998) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
106 id.
107 Dr. Alan F. Westin and Opinion Research Corp., November 1999:
Personalized Marketing and Privacy on the Net: What Consumers Want (Nov.
1999), available at http://www.pandab.org/doubleclicktoc.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The survey may be purchased
through the Surveys & Studies link on the Privacy and American Business
website at http://www.pandab.org, and is on file with the author.
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group.' 10 8 According to the same survey, three out of four Internet
users said that when they are online, they want it all: privacy
notices from websites, benefits from websites, and websites'
adherence to their privacy policies.1
0 9
The IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Study,
published in 1999, was the first significant survey of consumer
perceptions toward online privacy. 1 0 The respondents included
residents of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
The IBM study measured consumer attitudes toward privacy in
everyday business transactions and explored consumers' attitudes
toward personalized marketing in general and their views of how
companies handle personal information in different countries.
Results from the survey indicated that banks and healthcare
companies compared favorably with insurance companies,
department stores, catalogs, and Internet companies in terms of
enjoying the greatest degree of confidence from respondents.' 1' In
addition, the survey revealed that the consumers most likely to take
steps to protect themselves are precisely those that are of greatest
interest to marketers: younger, more educated, and, generally,
more affluent consumers in their peak earning years. 1 2 The
survey also revealed that privacy protection behaviors are more
likely to occur at financial and insurance websites than at
healthcare websites." 
3
The Earp and Payton study, published in 2000, was based
on a survey of financial and healthcare workers and revealed that
privacy concerns are not confined to consumers but also include
employees who access and collect consumer data." 14 An
interesting finding of Earp and Payton is that healthcare workers
are concerned about organizational practices that they believe
cause errors in patient information, as well as the unsanctioned use
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 IBMPrivacy Survey, supra note 4.
... Id. at 12.
112Id. at 15.
"'
3 Id. at 12.
114 Earp and Payton, supra note 98, as 51-54.
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of patient information. 115 Similarly, the study indicates that
employees of financial institutions are concerned with
organizational practices that allow improper access to customer
information. 16
The Earp and Payton study surveyed healthcare workers
who had access to medical records as to their views about the
greatest threats to the privacy of those records. Using a Likert
scale, respondents at a local hospital were asked a series of
questions about privacy policies and practices of their employer. 17
Among the major findings of the study was the respondents'
emphatic agreement that:
(1) The greatest threat to the privacy of medical
records occurred when their employer made
unauthorized secondary distribution of patient
healthcare records to outside firms, and
(2) That their "employer should devote more time
and effort verifying the accuracy of the patient
information in its databases."'"18
5 1d. at 54.
116 id
117 Likert scales, first developed in the 1930s by R. Likert, are explained in detail
in J. NUNNALLY, PYCHOMETRIC THEORY (1978). The idea behind Likert scales
is to transform ordinal variables into numeric variables. A short, online "all you
need to know" article about Likert scaling is located at William M.K. Trochim,
Likert Scaling, available at http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/scallik.htm (last
revised June 29, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Baumer, Earp, and Payton, supra note 11, used a seven-point
Likert scale beginning with Strongly Disagree (1) and ending with Strongly
Agree (7). If all the assumptions necessary for using Likert scales are satisfied,
researchers can meaningfully calculate average responses to statements and
make statistical comparisons. For example, if the survey average response to a
statement was 1.5, the response would indicate that most respondents agreed or
strongly disagreed with the statement. If the average response to a statement
was 6.5, it would mean most respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the
statement.
118 The survey results found by Baumer, Earp, and Payton, supra note 11,
indicated that respondents strongly agreed (6.51 on a seven-point Likert scale)
that their employer (a hospital) should not make unauthorized secondary
distributions of patient healthcare records and agreed with almost equal
emphasis (6.48) that more attention should be devoted to making sure healthcare
records were accurate.
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B. Shortcomings of Prior Studies of Online Behavior
Although these studies are informative and relevant, they
treat threats to privacy as an aggregate issue and do not explore the
elemental components of online privacy. None of the studies ask,
component by component, about the willingness of consumers to
reveal personal information. The survey developed for this article
reveals that some people are very concerned about the privacy of
their financial records, while others are more concerned about the
privacy of their medical records. Personal privacy and its online
protection have a number of components that should be examined
individually, rather than as an overall concept. For example,
asking respondents whether they would be willing to reveal their
social security numbers to actual websites is much different than
asking respondents whether they would reveal "personal
information" about themselves online. The survey developed by
the authors employed a component-by-component analysis of the
concerns of people about online privacy issues, rather than
lumping all the components of personal information together and
treating the privacy issue in the aggregate.
Additionally, previous studies do not explain the impact
privacy concerns will have on e-commerce and the willingness of
consumers to supply information online to websites.' 19 More
specifically, the survey developed for this article addresses
whether websites could assuage consumers' privacy concerns by
taking certain steps, such as opt out provisions, third party webseal
monitors, offerings of targeted advertisements, and participation in
games or offers of gifts, discounts, and cash. The survey
developed by the authors asked respondents which measures taken
by websites to assure their trustworthiness were in fact decisive
and effective in gaining their trust so that they would reveal
personal information. For example, using a five-point Likert scale,
it asked respondents to respond to the following statement, "My
level of confidence in the privacy practices of the website is
"9 K.B. Sheehan & H.G. Hoy, Flaming, Complaining, Abstaining: How Online
Users Respond to Privacy Concerns, 28 J. OF ADVERTISING 37 (1999).
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influenced by: If I were given the option to 'opt out' or disallow
the distribution or sale of information about me."' 120 Consumer
responses to actions and programs taken by websites to assure
reliability have tremendous implications for the future expansion
of B2C e-commerce.
C. Survey Design: Steps Taken to Assure Reliability
This study analyzed data collected from an online survey
linked to several online resources, including the North Carolina
State University E-Commerce website and the website of a major
healthcare insurer.121 The data was collected during the latter half
of 2000 through early 2001 and represents the opinions of 415
respondents. The respondents, although more educated than the
population at large, are educationally and demographically
comparable to the diversity found among Internet users in general
and in other studies. 122 The average web usage of the survey's
respondents was approximately thirteen hours per week, with fifty-
two percent of respondents having more than four years of prior
Internet use.
The survey was administered online so that each
respondent would face one of thirty randomly appearing web pages
while responding to the survey questions.123 The thirty websites
120 This study used a five-point Likert scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Unsure,
Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.
121 The E-Commerce project at North Carolina State University ("NCSU") is
headed by Professor Michael Rappa, Alan T. Dickson Professor of Information
Technology. The E-Commerce Project website is located at
http://ecommerce.ncsu.edu. E-Commerce.edu, at http://ecommerce.ncsu.edu
(Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
122 For a fee, Netscore provides data as to who accesses one's website.
Netscore, What's Your NetScore?, at http://www.netscoreonline.com/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
123 When respondents took the survey, they were online and were not prompted
in any way by the authors. Respondents encountered the surveys while
browsing through the E-Commerce website at NCSU or while browsing through
the website of a major healthcare insurer in North Carolina, Blue Cross Blue
Shield of North Carolina, at Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, at
http://www.bcbsnc.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the North
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were equally divided among retail, medical or health, and financial
websites. This study focused on the aforementioned website
categories because they tend to request more personal information
from visitors. Within the three categories of websites, fifteen were
well-known websites, and fifteen were lesser-known websites. A
well-known website is defined as one listed in the top 1,500
websites, ranked by unique users, from PC Data Online, 2000.124
Lesser-known websites are those that are not listed in the top 1,500
websites.
The survey consisted of thirty-four responses to various
statements such as, "I would provide my phone number to this
website." The survey employed a five-point Likert scale anchored
by "Strongly Disagree" (1) and "Strongly Agree" (5), providing
five possible responses per question. Of the 415 respondents, 129
observed one of the ten retail websites, 159 observed one of the ten
medical or health websites and 127 observed one of the ten
financial websites.
D. Unique Features of this Survey
The survey developed for this article is unique in several
ways, but like the other surveys, it suffers from limitations that
caution against making strong statements about the survey results'
implications for the general population of computer users.'25 The
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). All responses were anonymous to the
authors, and surveys were not taken in the authors' presence. The websites that
respondents were shown were actual websites that can be accessed on the
Internet.
124 PCDataOnline was a respected Internet website traffic rating company that
released polling results on a monthly basis to its subscribers. The original
website, at http://www.PCDataOnline.com, was eventually redirected to
http://www.netscoreonline.com/. Netscore, What's Your NetScores?, at
http://www.netscoreonline.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Now, NetScore provides these
polling statistics online.
125 The science of surveys is sufficiently imprecise and random that researchers
should be wary of making strong statements about the population based on the
survey responses of a small sample. Using standard survey methodology, a
sample of 415 enables one to perform most statistical tests, such as whether the
means between females' and males' responses are so different that the
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science of taking surveys online or in other settings makes use of a
plethora of unverifiable, mainly mathematical, assumptions that
are not often realized in the real world. 126 Because reality is not
always as random as is assumed in marketing research textbooks,
experienced survey administrators know enough to be cautious
about making strong inferences on the basis of a single survey.
1. Disaggregation of Privacy Concerns
The survey first investigated the elemental components of
privacy by exploring the individual factors that influence online
behavior, rather than treating the privacy issue in the aggregate.
Instead of being quizzed about their general concerns about
privacy, respondents in the survey were asked to consider whether
they would provide their name, address, social security number,
and other personal information to randomly displayed web pages
(see Table 1 below).
2. Realism
Second, the survey design uses the flexibility of the World
Wide Web to offer respondents a realistic visualization of websites
to illustrate survey questions. By providing actual screen shots of
well known and lesser-known retail, medical, and financial
websites, the survey brings survey respondents closer to the
situations they face in online sessions when they have to decide
difference is unlikely to be due to chance. Underlying the statistical tests,
however, are a number of critical assumptions. One assumption, for example, is
that the demographics of the general population are the same as those of the
sample. Another assumption is that respondents understand the questions, even
though there is no way of knowing whether this assumption is accurate because
the respondents are anonymous. The assumptions commonly made in
administering surveys are voluminous and there are additional challenges when
administering online surveys.
A for-profit firm, CustomInsight, discusses administering online
surveys at http://www.custominsight.com/. CustomInsight, Custom Internet
Surveys, at http://www.custominsight.com/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
126 Id.
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whether to reveal personal, demographic, medical, and financial
information to a specific type of website. The realism of asking
consumers to respond online to actual screen captures of websites
considerably enhances the reliability of the survey's results relative
to asking consumers, in the abstract, about their willingness to
reveal personal information online.
3. Non-Recursiveness and Iteration
Third, the survey is non-recursive and iterative."' It not
only asked respondents to reveal what they would be willing to
reveal to websites, but also whether websites can do anything to
allay privacy-related concerns. In effect, the survey assumes by its
questions that consumer reactions to the actions of websites vis-a-
vis privacy will cause websites to react by changing their policies.
As an added check, the survey asked respondents to reveal some
personal information, although no information was demographic or
personally identifying. 28 The efficacy of self-regulatory actions
by websites should be of interest to both businesses that maintain
websites and policy-makers who have a difficult time striking the
proper balance between freedom and government regulation.
127 A "non-recursive" relationship occurs when the following takes place: A
affects B, but B then affects A. In other words, it may be characterized as a
feedback loop. In this analysis, the authors hypothesize that policies of
websites affect visitors, but visitors' reactions to those policies cause websites to
change those policies. If websites do not respect privacy wishes of online
visitors, then there will be fewer online visitors. Websites react to fewer online
visitors by making more and more credible claims of caring for personal
information revealed to them in a way that reflects the wishes of the information
provider. The survey attempts to capture not only a measure of the privacy
concerns of respondents, but also their reactions to measures websites use to
entice them to reveal personal information. The survey is metaphorically
iterative in the sense that it reveals how privacy concerns of consumers
reverberate through the system. For a discussion of the difference between
recursive and non-recursive models, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK AND LINDA
S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICs 744 (3rd ed.1996).
128 In other words, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to
reveal demographic information to a random sample of websites that the authors
selected. Respondents were then asked to reveal their demographic information
to us.
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E. Hypotheses Generated from Legal and Economic
Analysis of the Market for Online Personal
Information
The hypotheses discussed below are based on the following
assumptions:
(1) The market for information acquisition and
distribution in cyberspace is, with some
significant exceptions, unregulated; and
(2) Consumers really have no satisfactory legal
recourse when personal information is
lawfully and voluntarily acquired by
websites but misused or distributed to third
parties without authorization because, in
general, damages are too small to justify a
lawsuit, or jurisdictional issues prevent
effective lawsuits. 1
29
These two assumptions imply that anarchy reigns in the market for
online voluntary acquisition of personal information. If personal
information is requested from consumers by a website and
respondents assume that they have no legal recourse if the
information they provide to websites is misused, it is logical that
some of the following factors may affect the willingness of
consumers to supply personal information:
1. Well Known Websites (Brand Name
Awareness) Consumers would be more willing
to reveal information to websites with which
they are familiar.
2. Personally Identifying Information
Consumers would be more reluctant to reveal
personally identifying information about
129 This prediction assumes that respondents are aware that medical and financial
websites are more regulated than are other websites. Undoubtedly, many
respondents were unaware of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the HIPAA
regulations, but they and Internet users generally are more educated than the
general population, so this assumption is not so extreme.
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themselves than demographic information, such
as age, race, sex, and email address.
3. Identity Theft or Credit Card Fraud
Consumers would be most reluctant to reveal
information about themselves that could enable
someone to steal their identity or gain access to
their credit cards.
Using the model of an unregulated market with no legal
recourse when fraud or deliberate contract breaches occur, other
predictions about the willingness of consumers to reveal
information are plausible.
4. Gender Cyberstalking is probably more
threatening to women than to men, and
therefore, it is predicted that women would be
less willing to reveal information about
themselves than men.
5. Effect of Government Regulation Since
medical and financial records are subject to
more government regulation, it is submitted that
consumers would be more willing to reveal
information to those kinds of websites relative
to retail websites, which are the least regulated
of the three.13
0
Data from other surveys reveals that consumers are
concerned about protecting and controlling their personal
information.'
3 1
6. Importance of Opt Out Options It follows that
consumers would highly prize opt out options
by websites to allow them to retain more control
over the use of personal information.
Consumers who reveal personal information are often
disturbed by the feeling that someone else is making money from
"their" personal information.
7. Purchases or Trades for Personal
Information Since websites value personal
130 Froomkin, supra note 6.
131 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 4; Westin, supra note 4; IBM
Privacy Survey, supra note 4.
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information, they could ameliorate consumer
misgivings about revealing personal information
by offering monetary and non-monetary
incentives in the form of targeted
advertisements that apprise consumers of
bargains that may be of interest to them.
III. Survey Results
A. Demographic, Personal, Financial, and Medical
Information
Respondents were shown one of thirty websites and were
asked to respond using a five-point Likert scale, with 1 being
Strongly Disagree and 5 being Strongly Agree, to the following
statement:
I would provide the following information about myself to this
website:
Table 1
Willingness to Supply Information to this Screenshot(Average Responses in Boldface)
Age Gender Race or Ethic Name Address
3.453 3.525 3.135 3.029 2.512
Phone # E-mail address Credit Card # Employer Income
name
2.184 3.152 1.893 2.017 1.804
Social Prescription Personal Medical
Security Drug History Info
1.464 2.773 1.751
As is apparent from Table 1, respondents are least reluctant
to supply basic demographic information, such as age, gender,
race, and ethnicity, about themselves. Demographic information,
of course, is not individually identifying. It is also clear that, on
average, respondents were far less willing to supply personally
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identifying information about themselves. The lowest stated
willingness among respondents to supply information occurs with
regard to social security numbers, income, credit card numbers,
and medical records, each of which is individually identifying,
with the exception of income. Respondents were also very
reluctant to reveal the name of their employer and their phone
number, each of which is information that could make consumers
vulnerable if unscrupulous individuals possessed such data.
Respondents were more willing to supply their name, e-mail
address, and prescription drug history than the name of their
employer. Certainly, giving out e-mail addresses is far less
revealing than disclosing a credit card number, but respondents to
the survey developed for this article seemed only slightly less
willing to give out actual names compared to e-mail addresses. In
ordinary offline transactions, it is common to give out one's name
to total strangers, but it is far less common to reveal one's social
security number, credit card numbers, or income.
The ordinal rank of customer willingness to supply various
types of information exhibited in Table 1 seems plausible.132 It is
likely that the reluctance of respondents to supply a social security
number reflects a fear of identity theft. Also, most people are very
reluctant to release medical information about themselves, except
to their physicians or other medical personnel. Similarly, most
people regard information about their income as private, and since
they are concerned about their jobs, they are very reluctant to
reveal their employer. Respondents were less concerned about
basic demographic data and were more willing to reveal their e-
mail address and name than the very personal and traceable
information listed above.
132 "In common usage, an ordinal number is an adjective which describes the
numerical position of an object, e.g., first, second, third, etc." Eric W.
Weisstein, Wolfram Research, at
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/OrdinalNumber.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). If a person
prefers A to B and B to C, the ordinal rank of preference is A B C. Ordinal rank
says nothing, however, about how much more A is preferred relative to B or C.
Given the stochastic nature of survey responses, the most important statistic in
Table 1 is probably the ordinal rank rather than the absolute value of responses
based on a Likert scale.
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The mean differences in respondents' willingness to supply
information by category reflect the uncertain legal environment of
e-commerce. If the legal environment in cyberspace were secure,
if there was adequate legal redress for the breach of promises made
in privacy statements, and if privacy statements themselves were
understandable and balanced, mean scores in Table 1 would be
expected to be in the 4 to 5 range. The fact that mean scores for
some types of information are in the 1 to 2 range indicates that
respondents in the survey viewed the legal environment in
cyberspace as being very insecure.
B. Additional Statistical Relationships
1. Well-Known versus Less Well-Known
Websites
The range in mean responses in Table 1 indicates that
consumers are very selective about the type of information that
they will and will not supply to websites. This selectivity is further
evidenced when compared with respondents' willingness to supply
personal information based on whether the website was well-
known or not well-known, according to the criteria discussed
above. Of the 415 respondents, 217 observed one of the fifteen
lesser-known sites while 198 observed one of the fifteen well-
known sites. The stated willingness of respondents to provide
telephone numbers, home addresses, e-mail addresses, social
security numbers, and credit card numbers to websites was
significantly different (p<.05) with respect to whether the website
was well-known or not well-known. 133 Although the respondents
133 All statistical tests based on survey sample results are based on a number of
underlying assumptions that may or may not be satisfied. When statistical
analysis reveals that the difference in sample means is significant at the .05
level, it means that there is less than a one in twenty chance that the difference
in the means is due to chance-assuming the survey sample is truly random and
representative of the population. If, for example, people willing to complete
online surveys were different from the general population in some way, then the
sample results would not be representative of the general population.
Statisticians often make what are termed "heroic" assumptions because there is
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as a whole reacted negatively to providing these five categories of
information to the observed website, they were much more
negative towards the lesser-known websites. It can be inferred
from this that consumers are more willing to provide their home
address, phone number, email address, social security number, and
credit card number to a well-known website compared to a lesser
known website. Such a distinction is in part because consumers do
not have confidence that the e-commerce legal environment is
secure enough for them to have a remedy if less well-known
websites misuse their personal information. Apparently, investing
in goodwill is a valuable asset for websites.
2. Differences Based on Type of Website
Overall, there is a statistically significant difference (p<.05)
in respondents' average willingness to supply information
attributable to the type, retail, financial, or medical or health, of
website at issue.134 Put differently, the survey's respondents were
more willing to divulge information to medical or health websites
than to retail or financial websites. Individually, there were
significant differences for five individual categories of personal
information: age, gender, race, employer, and medical records.
Respondents were more likely to provide their age, gender, race,
employer, and medical information to health websites than retail
websites.135 When comparing health websites with financial
websites, the differences were less striking, but respondents were
more inclined to provide their employer and medical information
to health websites. These results could possibly be attributed to
legislation that protects bank records and medical records, as well
as the lack of legislation surrounding retail websites.
no way of knowing whether the survey sample is truly representative of the
general population.
134 Again, these differences are significantly different at the .05 level (p<.05).
135 These differences are significantly different at the .05 level (p<.05).
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3. Differences in Willingness to Supply Personal
Information Based on Gender
The survey not only asked respondents if they would be
willing to share certain types of personal information, but it also
asked respondents to actually share some of that information. In
particular, the survey asked respondents their gender. If a
respondent refused to reveal his or her gender, then his or her
gender was recorded as 0 (zero). Females who revealed their
gender were recorded as "1," and males willing to reveal their
gender were recorded as "2." Of those respondents who did state
their gender, there were statistically significant differences
between men and women with respect to their stated willingness to
divulge personal information. By statistically significant margins,
women were more reluctant than men to divulge their names,
addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, employers, and social
security numbers, and these differences were statistically
significant. Many of the aforementioned components of privacy
(e.g., names, etc.), of course, could place women at risk physically
from stalkers, a risk about which many men are not concerned.
Again, if the legal environment in cyberspace were insecure, one
would expect that the more vulnerable members of society,
women, for example, would be more reluctant to share information
that could be misused.
4. Age-Related Differences in Willingness to
Supply Personal Information
The survey developed for this article also asked
respondents their ages. A comparison of respondents in the fifteen
to thirty-five year age group with those over thirty-five years of
age revealed that the younger group was much more willing to
provide their name, age, and gender, read privacy policies, and
give personal information in exchange for cash or a gift offered by
websites. 136 As a group, older respondents were more concerned
136 These differences were significant at the .05 level (p<.05). The latter two
categories, "reading privacy policies" and willingness to "provide personal
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about identity theft, losing control of their information, the
unauthorized redistribution of their information, and exposure to
unscrupulous people. All of these differences based on age were
statistically significant. Older respondents were more cautious and
more fearful of the downside risks associated with the loss of
control over personal information. Again, these results appear
plausible and reflect the uncertain legal environment in the market
for personal information. Younger respondents were willing to
take more risks by providing more information, but as a group,
they probably have less to fear from identity theft because their
financial assets are typically far less significant than the financial
assets of respondents over the age of thirty-five.
C. Privacy Policies, Brand Names, Website Design, and
Third-Party Monitors
The next series of questions were directly related to the
issue of self-regulation with regard to privacy and the trust that
customers place in privacy policies, the brand names of websites,
and third-party monitors. Respondents were asked to respond to
the following statements: 
137
If this were my first visit to the site, I would read the privacy
policy:
I trust that this website adheres to its privacy policy:
My level of confidence in the privacy practices of the website is
influenced by:
I am familiar with privacy seal programs (such as, CPA
WebTrust, BBBOnline and TRUSTe):
information in exchange for cash or a gift offered by websites" are discussed in
Tables 2 and 4. See infra p. 266 and p. 268.
137 The statements have been edited for brevity in the text. The actual questions,
reproduced in the Appendix, provide explanations of some of the terms, such as
CPA WebTrust, BBB Online Privacy, and TRUSTe, as well as other additional
details.
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I would be more likely to share personal information with the
above website if it carried the (CPA Web Trust, or BBBOnline,
or TRUSTe-three separate questions):
Table 2
Privacy Practices of Websites
(Average Responses in Boldface)
Read Privacy Policy Trust Privacy Policy
3.345 3.427
Company or Brand Privacy Statement Design of Website
Name Provided
3.875 3.592 2.903
Option to Opt Out Web Seal Is Present Familiar With Privacy Seal
3.877 3.234 2.821
CPA WebTrust BBB Online Privacy TRUSTe Seal
3.369 3.336 3.225
The survey results in Table 2 suggest that only slightly
more than half of the respondents read privacy statements when
they first visit a website. About the same number trust that
websites adhere to their privacy policies. If those figures reflect
the general population, it suggests a great deal of skepticism
among consumers visiting websites. According to the results of
the survey developed for this article, consumer confidence
increases when the website is a company or brand name and when
the website has an opt out option. The fact that a website has a
privacy policy is viewed as being important, but interestingly,
respondents indicated that the design of a website does not
significantly instill more confidence. The factor that most
promotes confidence is having the option to opt out, which reveals
that consumers most highly value the ability to control use of the
personal information that they provide to websites. Among the
respondents, all of the third-party monitors of adherence to privacy
policies were viewed as mildly increasing confidence in the
website. There was, however, no perceived difference between the
three services by respondents in terms of an increasing willingness
to share personal information.
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Overall, the results in Table 2 suggest that consumers have
more confidence in websites that are brand names and those that
offer opt out options. Slightly more than half of the respondents
indicated that they read privacy policies the first time they visit
websites and about the same number indicated that the presence of
web seals and web seal companies (TRUSTe and the others) would
make them more willing to reveal personal information. The
ubiquity of privacy policies and third-party web seals suggests that
most websites are cognizant of consumer fears regarding personal
information and have responded in ways that somewhat allay those
fears.
D. Identity Theft, Unsolicited Communication, and
Other Exposure
Among the concerns that consumers and other visitors to
websites have is that personal information will be acquired and
used in unauthorized ways. Some of the unauthorized uses of
personal information result in the victim becoming an unwanted
target of advertisers, invasions of privacy, and having one's
identity stolen through acquisition of social security or credit card
numbers.
The next question asked respondents to respond to the
following statement:
My concern about sharing information about myself with the
above website is:
Table 3
Consequences of Revealing Information to Websites
(Average Responses in Boldface)
Identity Theft Theft of Credit Card # Receiving Unsolicited
Advertising
3.8895 4.12155 4.1492
Lack of Control over Unauthorized Distribution My Family Being
Personal to a Third Party Exposed to Unscrupulous
Information People
4.2431 4.33702 3.95028
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Table 3 reveals some strong reactions by respondents to
each of the possible negative consequences listed associated with
providing personal information online to websites. Respondents
seemed most troubled about the unauthorized distribution of
personal information to third parties and the lack of control over
personal information, but they were also very concerned about
identity theft, theft of credit card numbers, receiving unsolicited
advertising, and having their families exposed to unscrupulous
people. The results posted in Table 3 reflect not only the concerns
of Internet travelers to websites, but also an awareness of how their
information can be misused. The high scores indicate that most of
the respondents agree or strongly agree that they are concerned
about the various negative consequences of revealing personal
information to websites.
E. Willingness of Websites to Share Information with
Third Parties
The next question asked respondents to respond to the
following:
I would allow the website to share personal information about
me with a third party:
Table 4
Willingness to Share Information with Third Parties
(Average Responses in Boldface)
To Receive Targeted Advertising To Receive Targeted Advertising via
via Mail e-mail
1.901 2.00
To Receive Cash, Coupons, or a To Participate in a Prize or Lottery
Free Gift
2.50 2.243
It appears from Table 4 that respondents were less than
enthusiastic about receiving either targeted advertising delivered
by the post office or transmitted as e-mail. Unsolicited
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conventional mail is often labeled "junk mail" and unsolicited e-
mail is derisively called "spam." Respondent enthusiasm for giving
third parties access to their personal information increased
somewhat if the respondents were offered cash, coupons, or a free
gift by the website. Respondents were somewhat less excited
about the prospect of sharing personal information with third
parties in return for the opportunity to participate in a prize or
lottery. Overall, the respondents were unenthusiastic about the
secondary distribution of their personal information, even if they
received the incentives most commonly awarded by websites to
their members and visitors. Again, the results of this portion of the
survey indicate the importance individuals attach to maintaining
control over their personal information.
F. Hypotheses Check
The responses to this survey were consistent with virtually
all of the hypotheses posed. By statistically significant margins,
respondents indicated that they were more willing to reveal
personal information in several categories to well-known websites
as compared with less well-known websites. The vast differences
in willingness to reveal certain types of personally identifying
information as compared to demographic information can be
attributed to anarchy in cyberspace. Respondents seemed to be
quite aware of the possible serious consequences of identity theft,
credit card fraud, and the unauthorized distribution of personal
information to third parties. As predicted, women were more
reluctant to reveal information than men for a number of categories
of personal information. Most respondents viewed very favorably
the option offered by many websites to opt out.
IV. Conclusion
Vast skepticism about the legal status of personal
information revealed to websites caused the respondents in the
survey to be very cautious in their stated willingness to reveal
personal information online. Outside of cyberspace, there are
many situations in which personal information is requested of
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clients, patients, and others in confidential or contractual
relationships with professionals and retail establishments. These
requests meet nowhere near the reluctance to provide such
information as do online requests. For example, whether wise or
not, loan applicants routinely provide a complete financial history
to banks, and the applicants are not concerned that banks will resell
that information or that identity theft will take place as a result.
Also, patients regularly provide comprehensive medical histories
to physicians and do not expect to have that information used for
other purposes such as qualifying for insurance policies or
applying for jobs. Similarly, job applicants fill out forms that
request phone numbers, addresses, former employers, and social
security numbers, and yet, there is little fear among job applicants
that the information they provide will be sold to third parties.
On the other hand, the same level of consumer confidence
cannot be said to exist for Internet transactions. In addition to
involuntary acquisitions of information that take place through
cookies, web bugs, spyware, and other surreptitious devices,
voluntary disclosures to websites are often accompanied by major
uncertainty. This uncertainty is so great that privacy policies are
now part of standard operating procedures for most websites.
Website privacy policies, however, are not always user friendly;
typically, they are heavy on legalese, including exclusions,
waivers, and limitations of liability. Also, they change from time
to time, so that even if a website's stated policy satisfied a
consumer's preference at the time the information was given, the
policy could change and, thereby, thwart the consumer's
confidence. It is unrealistic to expect consumers to repeatedly read
the privacy policies of a website that they have already visited and
inspected, and yet, prudence demands that they do so. In addition,
not all websites adhere to their privacy policies. Lack of adherence
is apparently such a problem that websites prominently advertise
third party monitoring of adherence to their own privacy policies.
Outside of cyberspace, visual inspection of the business and the
people one deals with provides information as to the reliability of
the business and its operators. Such inspections are not always
pogsible in cyberspace. The consequences of this loss of control of
personal information in cyberspace can be devastating, and
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awareness of these consequences appears to be very much on the
minds of consumers.
Some claim that the Internet exploded precisely because its
architects did not have to wait for the approval of government
bureaucrats.138 The lack of government regulation is a claimed
hidden asset of the Internet, but government is increasingly
stepping in and beginning to regulate some Internet uses as the
number of people participating in e-commerce rises and abuses
receive wider publicity. Although websites that are primarily
financial, medical, or targeted towards children are subject to
comprehensive regulation and prohibitions, most websites are
unregulated and continue to collect, process, and distribute
personal information. Currently, consumers are protecting
themselves by being selective as to which websites they provide
information to and what information they provide. Whether this
state of affairs is stable, efficient, or long lasting, however, is
anyone's guess.
138 A sampling of anti-government sentiment is expressed by Citizens for a
Strong Economy, a group that promotes a book, entitled GOVERNMENT
REGULATION AND THE INTERNET: A STRANGLEHOLD ON THE FUTURE, that not
so subtly expresses the point of view of the authors toward government
regulation of the Internet. See Citizens for a Strong Economy, at
http://www.cse.org/informed/issues template.php/266.htm (Mar. 1, 2000) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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Appendix
Survey Instrument
Items 1 - 11 were placed on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by
"Strongly Disagree" (1) and "Strongly Agree" (5).
1. I would provide the following information about myself to this
website:
a. ... My age
b. ... My gender
c. ... My race or ethnicity
d. ... My name
e. ... My address
f. ... My home phone number
g. ... My email address
h. ... My buying preferences
i. ... The name of my employer
j. ... My Income
k. ... My social security number
1. ... My prescription drug history
m. ... Medical information about myself
2. If this were my first visit to the site, I would read the privacy
policy.
3. I trust that this website adheres to its privacy policy.
4. My level of confidence in the privacy practices of the website
is influenced by:
a. The company or brand name.
b. If a privacy statement were provided.
c. The design of the site.
d. If I were given the option to "opt-out" or disallow the
distribution or sale of information about me.
e. If a web seal were present on the site.
5. I am familiar with privacy seal programs (such as BBBOnline,
CPA WebTrust, and TRUSTe).
6. The CPA WebTrust Seal is a service of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants. It assures consumers that a
CPA has examined and approved a website's business practices
and controls. The site is tested for compliance at least every 90
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days. I would be more likely to share personal information
with the above website if it carried the CPA WebTrust Seal.
7. The BBB Online Privacy Seal Program assures consumers that
the website adheres to established privacy principles and
business practices and agrees to random monitoring by
Underwriters' Laboratory. I would be more likely to share
personal information with the above website if it carried the
BBB Online Privacy Seal.
8. The TRUSTe Seal assures consumers that a website adheres to
established privacy principles and has agreed to comply with
ongoing TRUSTe oversight. I would be more likely to share
personal information with the above website if it carried the
TRUSTe Seal.
9. How often do you visit websites that request personal
information? (e.g.: name, e-mail address, credit card number,
home address, phone number, etc.). Do not count multiple
visits to the same website.
10. My concern about sharing information about myself with the
above website is:
a. Theft of my identity.
b. Theft of my credit card number.
c. Receiving unsolicited communication.
d. Lack of control over who sees my personal information.
e. Unauthorized redistribution or sale of my personal
information to a third party.
f. My family being exposed to unscrupulous people or
inappropriate information.
11. I would allow the website to share personal information about
me with a third party:
a. To receive targeted advertising via postal mail.
b. To receive targeted advertising via my computer.
c. To receive cash, coupons, or a free gift.
d. To participate in a prize contest or lottery.
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